
Differences between identity and self-consciousness from a motricity approach

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Abstract

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With respect to brain evolution there exist theories that exalt metabolic solutions or cognitive capacities. The formers suggest that the brain size that made possible our cognition is bound to evolutive strategies that rescued synapsis effectivity and established the structural order of the nervous system by means of the settlement of adaptations that allow functional efficacy. On the other hand there are theories that establish a causal order in the size of the group and the increase of complexity in the nervous system; these last sustain that our species cognitive audacities underlie the growing complexity of the gregarious order and therefore they are linked to social efficacy movement. Both approaches are inserted in a paradigm that suggests that the brain evolved as a consciousness system that makes predictions as a univocal way to establish an efficient movement. They are theories that are subscribed in the idea that mind has evolved as an essentially motor organ.

The capacity of having identity is then framed in a cognitive approach that is supposed as an efficient movement necessity in a niche that has a gregarious growing complexity.

A standpoint that has had huge acceptance supposes that identity and self-consciousness are at the least similar; the argument rests in the idea that the conclusion of being an individual joined to the autobiography that is given to us by memory supposes the identity phenomenon. In this work we will sustain that identity is a capacity that is not necessarily conscious and that it comes from recognition that a group attributes to an individual, and that entity "knows" who he is without more necessity than to understand the here and now. In other words we will sustain that at least individuals classified in the *pongidae* group recognize their place in terms of social hierarchies in a group and that does not imply that they can project their social opportunities from their biography inserted in what their community does. Going a little further, they can recognize their influences, powers and limitations from other's behaviour with independence to the formation of a concept of themselves.

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